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CRIMINAL LAW
MARTHA C. DABNEY,* MATTHEW HOLT**
and SARAH CURRY SMITH***

I. HOMICIDE
Homcide cases during the Survey year dealt with a variety of
issues. The majority of the issues arose in the context of jury instructions which were challenged as improperly given, or which were alleged to have been improperly refused.
A. Instructions
1) Self-defense
In State v. Martinez' the supreme court held that the trial court
properly refused to give an instruction on self-defense. The defendant was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery with a firearm, and larceny over $2,500. The trial court refused the defendant's requested instruction on self-defense. On appeal, the defendant argued that a self-defense instruction should have been given
because evidence was introduced showing that there had been a
struggle at the scene of the homicide, that he had multiple wounds
on his head and legs, and that his hand was severely wounded. 2
The supreme court noted that self-defense is applicable only when
there is an appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily
harm which would put the reasonable person in fear of his safety. 3
The court set out the requirements for evidence sufficient to warrant
a self-defense instruction: "To warrant an instruction on selfdefense the evidence must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in
the minds of the jury as to whether or not a defendant accused of
homicide did act in self-defense." 4 Based on this standard, and the
peculiar facts of Martinez, the court said that there could be no reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were not self-defense.
*Lead Articles Editor, New Mexico Law Review.
**Processing Editor, New Mexico Law Review.
***Editor-in-chief, New Mexico Law Review.
1. 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981).
2. Id. at 423, 622 P.2d at 1043. The defendant argued that his hand wound would have
greatly diminished his grip. Id. Apparently, he wished for the court to infer that it would therefore be less likely for him to have been a willing aggressor.
3. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-7 (1978); N.M. U.J.l. Crim. 41.41.
4. 95 N.M. at 423, 622 P.2d at 1043, citing State v. Cochran, 78 N.M. 292, 430 P.2d 863
(1967).
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The facts of Martinez raise the unique question whether mere evidence of a struggle will give rise to a self-defense instruction. The
medical investigator in Martinez testified that the victim's scalp contained too many lacerations to count; the nose was distorted and
pushed to the side; a wire had been wrapped around the victim's
neck; there were "defensive" wounds on the victim's forearms; and
there was a penetrating bullet wound on the left arm and chest.' The
medical investigator further testified that the victim was alive at the
time he was shot, and that death resulted from hemorrhaging of the
brain caused by blows to the head.
The court stated that, by itself, circumstantial evidence of a struggle is not evidence to show a reaction to an appearance of the danger
of death or great bodily harm sufficient enough to warrant a selfdefense instruction. 6 Martinez should not be read to mean that
evidence of a struggle or wounds on the accused, which are consistent with a claim of self-defense, would not raise a "reasonable
doubt" as to the accused's claim. Instead, it should be read merely
for the proposition that evidence of a fight will not warrant a selfdefense instruction if the evidence from the fight does not support
the instruction at all.
The court noted that the wounds which the accused received were
consistent with the state's contention that the victim was struggling
to ward off the defendant's attack, but did not support the defendant's claim of self-defense. The court looked to the nature and extent of the victim's wounds and decided that the injuries caused by
the defendant were not consistent with a theory of self-defense. The
court held that because there was no showing of a reasonable fear of
death or severe injury, and because the wounds on the defendant and
the victim belied the defendant's claim of self-defense, the trial court
properly refused to give the tendered self-defense instruction. 7
In another case dealing with self-defense, State v. Montano,I the
court of appeals, using the same standard applied in Martinez, held
that the evidence did warrant an instruction of self-defense, and
reversed the trial court. Serna, the victim, and a friend had spent
most of the day drinking. In the early evening, they went to the defendant's home and, against her wishes, drank late into the night.
Serna became hostile. When the defendant refused to cook dinner
for him, he knocked a hole in the bathroom wall. Later, Serna's
friend agreed to leave and to take Serna with him. When Serna
5. 95 N.M. at 423, 622 P.2d at 1043.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980).
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learned that they were to go, he became angry and cursed the defendant. He looked at her threateningly and rose from his chair. The
defendant grabbed a gun 9 and backed up to the sink. The gun discharged and Serna was killed.
The trial court refused the defendant's requested self-defense instruction. The court of appeals held that under the circumstances,
the jury could have found that Montano acted reasonably, and that
she was put in fear of death or great bodily harm immediately before
she shot Serna. ,0Therefore, a self-defense instruction was proper.
2) Felony Murder
In State v. Wall' the court dealt with two challenges made in response to jury instructions. The defendant (Wall) was charged with
felony murder. The charge stemmed from a killing during a robbery.2
The first challenge was to the causation instruction given at trial.'
The defendant alleged that the jury instruction on causation did not
establish the causal link between the death and the felony as is required by State v. Harrison.3 The court decided that the contention
was without merit, because Harrison held only that Uniform Jury
Instruction-Criminal 2.04 was inadequate to explain causation
9. The defendant had become frightened earlier in the evening when she heard noises outside. Fearing that Serna and his friend were too drunk to defend her, she got the gun to protect
herself and forgot to put it away. Id. at 234, 620 P.2d at 888.
10. The state argued that a request for an instruction on the law of self-defense was inconsistent with the defendant's assertion that the gun accidentally discharged. The court noted that,
while the claims were inconsistent, evidence had been introduced which suggested the gun was
intentionally fired. The court held that because evidence was introduced which supported the
claim, the instruction was proper, even though the evidence was offered by the state. 95 N.M.
at 236, 620 P.2d at 890.
11.94 N.M. 169, 608 P.2d 145(1980).
12. The trial
court gave both U.J.l. Crim. 2.04 and 2.50. N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.04 provides:
For you to find the defendant guilty of felony murder, which is first degree
murder [as charged in Count . . .],the state must prove to your satisfaction

beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
I) The defendant [committed] [or] [attempted to commit] the crime of [name of
felony];
2) During [the commission of] [or] [the attempt to commit] the crime of [name
of felony], the defendant caused the death of [name of victim]. ...
N.M. U.J.I. 2.50 provides:
For you to find the defendant guilty of [name of crime], the state must prove
to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of the defendant
caused the death of [name of victim].
The cause of death is an act which, in a natural and continuous chain of
events, produces the death and without which the death would not have occurred. [There may be more than one cause of death. If the acts of two or more
persons contribute to cause death, each such act is a cause of death.]
13. 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977).
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when given alone. In Wall, Uniform Jury Instruction 2.04 was given,
but it was augmented by Uniform Jury Instruction 2.50. The court4
held that the use of the two together met the Harrisonrequirement.
The second challenge in Wall stemmed from the use of a jury instruction to answer a question presented by the jury. Throughout the
trial, the prosecutor had used the theory that Wall personally committed the felony. During deliberations, the jury asked whether "a
witness to, or a party to," a robbery is equally guilty of the crime of
robbery as is the person who committed the robbery.' 5 Over Wall's
objection, the trial judge responded by providing the jury with Uniform Jury Instruction-Criminal 28.32, which states that an accessory to a felony can be found guilty of felony murder, even though
he did not actually commit the felony. Wall argued that the trial
court's use of the jury instruction was error because it introduced a
new theory of liability, and he could not be found guilty on a theory
of murder which was not part of the prosecutor's case.
Relying on State v. Blea, 6 Wall argued that additional jury instructions should be limited to offenses within the indictment, because the indictment is the only means by which the defendant can
learn of the charges against which he must defend. The court agreed,
but concluded that the additional instruction did not go beyond the
indictment because the legislature and the courts have abolished the
distinction between a principal and an accessory.'I The court stated
that putting Wall on notice that he could be convicted as a principal
put him on notice that he could be convicted as an accessory.' 8 The
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving
the additional instruction.
3) Voluntary Manslaughter
Eight cases decided during the survey period involved murder convictions in which the defendant claimed he was improperly denied
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. In three cases the appellate courts decided that the evidence required a manslaughter in14. 94 N.M. at 172, 608 P.2d at 148.
15. Id.at 171, 608 P.2d at 147.
16. 84 N.M. 595, 506 P.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1973). Blea held that the purpose of an indictment
is to give the accused notice of the charges against him so that he may prepare a defense. A
defendant therefore, could not be tried for an offense not in the indictment, because he would
not be able to prepare an adequate defense. Preventing the defendant from preparing a defense
would deprive him of his right to a fair trial. Id. at 598, 506 P.2d at 342.
17. 94 N.M. at 171, 608 P.2d at 147.
18. Id. at 171-72, 608 P.2d at 147-48.
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struction.' 9 In the other five cases the convictions were affirmed.2 °
New Mexico law defines manslaughter generally as "the unlawful
killing of a human without malice." 2 ' Voluntary manslaughter is
manslaughter "committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
passion." 2 2 Heat of passion has been construed to include provocation and emotions other than those which are usually associated with
"passion." The New Mexico courts have included fear within the
scope of "heat and passion."
In State v. Garcia3 the court found no support for the defendant's
assertion that the evidence indicated heat of passion, and thus required a voluntary manslaughter instruction. During the course of
an altercation, Garcia pulled out a gun and the victim began running
away. Garcia pointed the gun in the air, then at the victim. Garcia
crouched, hesitated, and fired. Garcia admitted that he had accom19. Two of those cases were State v. Maestas, 95 N.M. 335, 622 P.2d 240 (1981) and State v.
Benavidez, 94 N.M. 706, 616 P.2d 419 (1980). The last of the three, State v. Montano, 95 N.M.
233, 620 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980), is discussed in detail in the section on self-defense instructions, supra at text accompanying notes 8 through 10. The defendant claimed that the facts
which would support an instruction on self-defense would also warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The court of appeals agreed and the conviction was reversed. It would
seem, both as a practical and a theoretical matter, that whenever a defendant is entitled to a
self-defense instruction, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is also warranted. If there
are facts which may have caused the defendant to believe his life or well-being were in danger,
this circumstance would be adequate to sustain a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
20. In one of those five cases, State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981), the
court held that an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not warranted. The facts of the
case are discussed in the text accompanying notes I through 7 supra.
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-3 (1978):
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.
A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is
guilty of a third degree felony.
B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a
lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner or without due
caution and circumspection.
Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony.
This definition of manslaughter is made difficult to understand in light of recent changes in the
law of homicide. The New Mexico legislature redefined murder in 1980 to exclude the term
"malice." Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-1 (1978) (murder defined in terms of malice) with
N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (murder defined without reference to malice). In
1980, the legislature also repealed N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-2, which defined malice.
The change in the law of murder makes the current statutory definition of manslaughter obsolete, because it uses a term which is foreign to the law of homicide in New Mexico. Only by
reference to the earlier statute can meaning be given to the still-effective definition of manslaughter.
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-3(A) (1978).
23. 95 N.M. 260, 620 P.2d 1285 (1980).
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plished his purpose of warning or scaring the victim before he fired
the fatal shot.
The court stated that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the defendant, showed that he was the aggressor in an altercation which led to the fatal shooting.24 The court held that there
was no evidence of provocation which would affect the defendant's
state of mind. The court did not directly address the issue of lack of
intent to actually shoot the decedent. Instead, the court translated
the question to one of whether the defendant had sufficient time to
develop deliberate intent. The court noted that "deliberate intent,"
as required by the murder statute, does not require a long thought
process, but may be arrived at in a "short" period of time.25
Evidence will be found sufficient to support a voluntary manslaughter conviction if the evidence, from whatever source and taken
in the light most favorable to the defendant, supports a finding of
sufficient provocation to the defendant. 2 6 This is true even where the
state is the source of the evidence of provocation. Thus, in State v.
Maestas" the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a voluntary
manslaughter instruction was improperly refused, even though the
only evidence before the court was the evidence of the state's witnesses. 8 The state's evidence showed that an argument took place
between the defendant and the victim outside a bar. Later, the defendant was sitting in his car. The victim, who was intoxicated, left the
bar and approached the car. The victim either staggered or lunged
toward the car and leaned in the car window. The defendant then
shot the victim. After the shooting, a knife was found near the victim's body. It was identified as similar to a knife owned by the victim. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and second
degree murder with use of a firearm, and appealed. The supreme
court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction. 9 The court did not
state its reason for that conclusion. Apparently, the court considered
that the evidence supported the inferences that the defendant believed that the victim intended to attack him, feared the attack, and
killed as a result of the fear provoked by the victim's conduct.
In cases involving provocation as a result of the defendant's fear,
the court may look to the prior relationships between the victim and
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 261,620 P.2d at 1286.
Id. at 262, 620 P.2d at 1287.
State v. Maestas, 95 N.M. 335, 622 P.2d 240 (1981).
Id.
The defense did not produce or present any evidence at all. Id. at 336, 622 P.2d at 241.
Id. at 337, 622 P.2d at 242.
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the defendant to determine whether the defendant was actually put
in fear of his life or safety. In State v. Benavidez,30 evidence was presented that the victim had once stolen a television set belonging to
the defendant and had assaulted the defendant's son in the past. Additional evidence showed that the victim had threatened to kill both
the defendant and his son on the afternoon of the shooting and that
the victim, while highly intoxicated, had come to the defendant's
home on the day of the shooting and had argued with the defendant.
During the course of the argument, the victim made a gesture which
could have been an attempt to strike or move for a weapon. 3 ' The
supreme court held that the evidence met the standard of provocation sufficient to sustain a conviction of voluntary manslaughter.3 2
The court noted that the relationship between the parties before
the shooting was relevant to whether fear was a motivating factor.
The court did not say expressly why these prior events were relevant
to its finding that fear was a motivating factor. The victim's assault
on the defendant's son and the threat to the defendant and his son
were apparently factors which helped sustain a finding that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was a present danger
to the defendant's safety.
3
In State v. Farris,"
however, the court did not look to the past relationship of the parties in deciding whether, under the facts of the
case, the defendant had been sufficiently provoked. In Farris, the
victim was killed by her husband of twenty years. Prior to the kill30. 94 N.M. 706, 616 P.2d 419 (1980).
31. "The gesture was variously characterized as a raised fist, a swing, a punch, an attempt
to strike and a move for a weapon." Id. at 707, 616 P.2d at 420. New Mexico case law is not
clear as to whether a gesture indicating an intent merely to strike would support a finding of
provocation which would justify a killing. The provocation would have to be measured in the
context of all the circumstances. The Benavidez court did not reach that question, however,
because the evidence showed that the gesture could have been interpreted as a move for a
weapon.
32. The state presented an argument that the failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter,
if error, was harmless. The state argued that the jury was instructed first to determine whether
the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, and only if they decided he was not, were they
to proceed to the lesser included offenses. See N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.40. The state argued that
because the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the jury would never have
discussed voluntary manslaughter.
The court rejected the state's argument, noting that a defendant is entitled to have his theory
of the case submitted to the jury. The court agreed that the jury is supposed to address the
murder charge first, but found that the jury's deliberations, nevertheless, could be affected by
knowing what choices they have. Assuming there was evidence of provocation, the jury was
not given the choice of finding that the defendant committed voluntary manslaughter. "To
argue that a finding by the jury that the defendant acted with deliberate intention precludes any
possibility that they could have found sufficient provocation begs the question. The jury was
simply not given the choice." 94 N.M. at 708, 616 P.2d at 421.
33. 95 N.M. 96, 619 P.2d 541 (1980).
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ing, the couple had been separated several times because the wife had
allegedly been seeing other men. During the final separation, the victim's current boyfriend and his brother had threatened the defendant twice. The defendant bought a gun to protect himself.
On the morning of the shooting, the defendant met with his wife.
A quarrel developed and the victim "poked [the defendant] in the
chest and told him to leave her boyfriend alone, that the boyfriend
could come into the house anytime he wanted." 3 What then happened is unclear. The defendant testified merely that he "lost his
head" and shot the victim. 35
The court did not look to the relationship during the twenty-year
marriage, or to the threats by the boyfriend and the brother. The
court cited Benavidez, but held that the circumstances most relevant
to provocation are those within the resgestaeof the killing. 6 It is not
clear whether Farrisis a retreat from the Benavidez approach, which
looked to the prior relations between the parties, or whether the
court merely decided that the prior relations between the parties in
Farrisdid not add up to sufficient provocation to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
The cases can best be reconciled by the making of a distinction between the kind of passion involved. In Benavidez, the prior relationships included assault and death threats, both of which can produce
fear. In Farristhe past relationships were not necessarily of the type
which would produce fear. Rather, they were a derivative of "lost
love. "
This distinction is supported by other cases involving provocation
of emotions other than fear. In State v. Lujan,3 7 the defendant killed
his ex-wife and her male friend. On the evening of the killing, the defendant was "taunted" by his ex-wife." One hour later, the defendant returned to the place where he had last seen his ex-wife, and
shot and killed her. Almost an hour after the first shooting, the
defendant went to the home of his ex-wife's friend and shot him.
The defendant claimed that a build-up of stress due to his wife's
infidelity, a divorce, and worries about his children contributed to
his emotional outburst on the evening of the killing.39 The defendant
requested an instruction of voluntary manslaughter, but the request
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 97, 619 P.2d at 542.
94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).
Id. at 233, 608 P.2d at 115.
Id.The trial court excluded evidence which tended to show a build-up of stress.

Winter 19821

CRIMINAL LAW

was denied. The jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder
of both the ex-wife and the friend.4
On appeal, the court implicitly rejected the defendant's contention
that a gradual build-up of emotional distress could justify or mitigate a killing. The court noted that the only evidence of actual provocation before the killing was the victim's "taunting" of the defendant. Noting that the court has before held that words alone cannot
be sufficient provocation to reduce a murder charge to voluntary
manslaughter,4 ' the court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant the
instruction.
Another Survey case, State v. Robinson," addressed a similar situation. The defendant was convicted of the murders of Tim Walker
and Christine Hitchcock. The evidence showed that the defendant
and Christine had dated on and off for about a year. The defendant
did not know Walker, nor did he know that Christine and Walker
had started dating shortly before the killings. 3
A high-speed chase took place between Walker's car and a car
similar to that of the defendant. The two cars stopped in front of
Walker's home. Walker went to the driver's side of the other car and
leaned down as though to talk to someone. A witness saw Walker
fall to the ground. Medical testimony revealed that Walker was dealt
a non-fatal shot in the chest. The defendant turned his car around,
came back, and stopped. The defendant got out of the car and shot
Walker in the head at close range.44 The opinion does not discuss the
details of Christine's death. 45
The defendant introduced no evidence of provocation. He argued
instead that he did not commit the homicides. The only evidence of
provocation was that the defendant and Christine had had a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. The court stated that such evidence
may have supported "an inference of a smoldering desire within the
defendant to avenge Christine dating another male by doing away
40. Id. at 232, 608 P.2d at 1114.
41. See State v. Trujillo, 27 N.M. 594, 203 P. 846 (1921).
42. 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 (1980).
43. Id. at 700, 616 P.2d at 413.
44. Id. at 696, 616 P.2d at 409.
45. It does discuss, in the context of an evidentiary question, an event on the day of her
death. The defendant fired a rifle into the air when Christine refused to get into his car with
him. The question before the court was whether a friend of Christine would be allowed to retell
the story of the incident as she heard it from Christine. The court held that it was hearsay, but
it was admissible as an "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 697, 616 P.2d
at 410. For an in-depth discussion of this issue in the Robinson case, see Norwood, Evidence,
12 N.M. L. Rev. 379 (1982).
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with both of them, but it would not support an inference of 'a sudden quarrel.' ,,6 Therefore, the court rejected the argument that the
facts could, as a matter of law, give rise to such provocation which is
"adequate and proper to negate the presumption of malice."" 7 The
court held that the instruction on voluntary manslaughter was properly refused because there was insufficient evidence of provocation
to warrant such an instruction.
4) Diminished Responsibility Defense and Insanity
The fourth Survey case dealing with jury instructions was State v.
Lujan."8 The defendant was convicted of the murder of his former
wife and an acquaintance. The defendant appealed, alleging that the
trial court erred in failing to give two requested instructions. The
trial court refused to instruct the jury on a diminished responsibility
defense, and refused to instruct on the consequences of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity. The supreme court held that the instructions were properly refused. 9
In Lujan, the defendant was taunted by his ex-wife. An hour later
he returned to the place he had last seen her, and shot and killed her.
Almost an hour later, the defendant appeared at the home of a longtime acquaintance, and shot and killed him. Lujan later surrendered
to the police. Testimony was introduced at trial that Lujan was suffering from frontal cortical atrophy and therefore had difficulty in
controlling his emotions. Conflicting evidence was admitted on
whether Lujan could control himself or his emotions on the night of
the crime.50 The defense theory was that the defendant's mental condition, coupled with a buildup of stress over a period of time, 5 ' resulted in his inability to stop himself from killing.5 2
Lujan claimed that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury
on diminished capacity. The Uniform Jury Instruction on insanity
includes an optional sentence which states: "[e]ven if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane, you must
still determine if he had the ability to form the deliberate intention to
take away the life of another."5 " The use notes to the instruction
46. 94 N.M. at 701, 616 P.2d at 414.
47. Id.
48. 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).
49. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d at 1116.
50. Id. at 233, 608 P.2d at 1115.
51. The buildup of stress was said to be caused by the discovery of his wife's infidelity, a
divorce, and worries about his children. Id.
52. Id.
53. N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 41.00:
Evidence has been presented concerning the defendant's sanity. In determin-

CRIMINAL LAW

Winter 1982]

provide that the optional sentence should be used when the defendant is charged with willful and deliberate murder and the evidence
will support a finding of inability to form intent.5" The court in Lujan relied on a distinction between being able to control one's emotions, and being able to formulate a deliberate plan.5" The court
stated that the record contained evidence that the defendant was able
to form a deliberate intent, 6 and held that the instruction on diminished capacity was properly refused. The court further noted that
there was no evidence that Lujan was not able to form a deliberate

intent.
The court in Lujan also held that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by rea8
the
son of insanity was proper. 57 Relying on State v. Chambers,"
court noted that the consequences of a verdict are not a relevant consideration for the jury, and that the jury need only "patiently and
dispassionately weigh the evidence and arrive at a verdict in accordance with the law as given to them by the court." 9
B. OtherIssues
Other homicide cases decided during the survey year dealt with a
variety of issues. Those issues included double jeopardy and venue.
1. Double Jeopardy
In State v. Martinez,6" the court held that the imposition by the
trial court of consecutive sentences for felony murder, armed robing whether or not the defendant was sane, you may consider all the evidence including

[.

..

1

A person is insane if, as a result of a mental disease, he
If you determine that the defendant committed the act charged but you are not
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time, you must find
him not guilty by reason of insanity. [Even if you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was sane, you must still determine if he had the ability
to form deliberate intention to take away the life of another] ...
(emphasis added).
54. Use note 3 to N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.00.
55. 94 N.M. at 234, 608 P.2d at 1116.
56. Id.at 233, 608 P.2d at 1115.
57. Id.at 234, 608 P.2d at 1116.
58. 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972). In Chambers the defendant was charged with murdering his wife. He defended on the ground of insanity and was refused a requested instruction
which would have apprised the jury as to the result of a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict. The supreme court held that the instruction was properly refused because it would have
put an irrelevant issue before the jury. The court also noted that the refusal was in accord with
those jurisdictions which express a majority view on the issue.
59. 94 N.M. 234, 608 P.2d at 1116.
60. 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041 (1981).
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bery, and larceny over $2,500 did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 6 ' At issue in Martinez was whether
the offenses were separate and distinct, or whether they merged into
the same offense. The court held them to be separate offenses, relying on State v. Stephens,6 2 an earlier New Mexico case. State v.
Stephens stands for the proposition that armed robbery and felony
murder need not be merged, because they are different offenses.
Martinez acknowledged that under the Stephens rule the offenses
would not be merged, but urged the court to reconsider the Stephens
rule in light of Whalen v. United States.63 In Whalen, the Supreme
Court held that charges of rape and felony murder merged. Martinez
argued that the case was analogous to his case, and that Stephens
should be overruled.6" The New Mexico Supreme Court declined to
revise the ruling in Stephens. The court reasoned that Whalen did
not reach the double jeopardy issue. Instead, it dealt with the interpretation of federal statutory law. The court stated that Whalen indicates that federal courts cannot impose consecutive sentences,
unless specifically authorized to do so by Congress. 65 Because there
was no statutory authorization for the imposition of consecutive
sentences, the federal court wrongly imposed the sentence, and the
Supreme Court reversed. 6 6 The Martinez court noted that, in New
Mexico, both statute and case law have defined felony murder and
armed robbery as separate offenses, even though they may arise out
of the same transaction. Imposing6 consecutive sentences on the
defendant, therefore, was not error. 1
2. Venue
Two homicide cases during the Survey year dealt with venue. In
State v. Martinez68 and in State v. Robinson6 9 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of motions for a change of venue."0
61. Id. at 425, 622 P.2d at 1045.
62. 93 N.M. 458, 601 P.2d 428 (1979).
63. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
64. See 95 N.M. at 424, 622 P.2d at 1044.
65. See 445 U.S. at 689.
66. Id. at 690.
67. 95 N.M. at 425, 622 P.2d at 1045.
68. 95 N.M. 445, 623 P.2d 565 (1981).
69. 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 (1980).
70. At least one other case dealing with venue was decided during the Survey year: Marsh v.
State, 95 N.M. 224, 620 P.2d 878 (1980). The defendants in Marsh were indicted by the Valencia County grand jury for the possession of over one hundred pounds of marijuana with intent
to distribute and with conspiracy to commit a felony. After a hearing, the trial judge granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis that jurisdiction and venue were not proper in
Valencia County.
The State alleged that defendant Marsh had flown over Valencia County in a small plane
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The basic scenario was the same in both cases. The defendants alleged that they could not receive a fair trial in the local courts, and
presented affidavits and witnesses to that effect.
In State v. Robinson, the trial court twice postponed its decision
of the defendant's motion for a change of venue. The trial court conducted the initial screening process of 123 venire persons by dividing
the panel into groups of twelve. The court excluded, sua sponte, any
prospective juror who had formed an opinion as to the innocence or
guilt of the defendant. These exclusions were made without any further inquiry as to the basis or strength of that opinion."'
On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his
motion for change of venue. The defendant did not claim that the
trial court improperly failed to exclude those people who did manifest a prejudice. The defendant claimed that the responses of jurors
on voir dire were not reliable and that their assurances were insufficient to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.72 Implicit in the
defendant's argument is a claim that the trial court improperly considered voir dire responses in ruling on the change of venue motion.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the motion
for change of venue, citing State v. Sierra.7 3 Sierra held that where a
trial court did not make a final ruling on a motion for change of
venue until after voir dire, the voir dire could be used as evidence by
the trial court in reaching its decision as to the change of venue motion. The court in Robinson noted that such a decision will not be
disturbed by the appellate court unless the defendant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion. The court implied that because the
burdened with 479 pounds of marijuana. Marsh met with defendant Bass in McKinley County
and unloaded the marijuana there. The plane never set down in Valencia County. On appeal
the supreme court held that the Valencia district court had both jurisdiction and venue. The
supreme court, however, issued a writ of superintending control mandating that the case be
transferred to McKinley County.
The court held that the state is vested with jurisdiction for offenses committed in the airspace
over New Mexico unless the federal government has preempted such regulation. The court
found that there was no preemption in this case, and the courts of New Mexico therefore had
jurisdiction to hear the case.
On the issue of venue, the court noted that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that trial shall be had "by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." The court noted that venue would properly lie only if the
offense of possession and conspiracy was committed in Valencia. The court held that the offense of possession was a continuing offense, and that it was committed in any county through
which the defendant traveled. The court also held that the conspiracy was committed in Valencia, because the defendant committed an "overt act" within Valencia County merely by passing through the county's airspace. 95 N.M. at 226, 620 P.2d at 880.
71. 94 N.M. at 695,616 P.2d at 408.
72. Id.
73. 90 N.M. 680, 568 P.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 414
(1977).
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defendant did not argue that the trial court abused its discretion, the
claim was rejected.
4 involved N.M. Stat. Ann. §§21-5-3 to -4 (1958
State v. Martinez"
Comp.), the predecessor of the current statute.75 The issue was
whether the statute made it mandatory for the court to grant a
74. 95 N.M. 445, 623 P.2d 565 (1981). Martinez also dealt with a second question. The second issue was whether the admission into evidence of a video-taped deposition of one of the
state's witnesses constituted error. 95 N.M. at 448-49, 623 P.2d at 568-69. The defendant
alleged that the use of the video tape denied him his right to confront witnesses against him and
that the state failed to meet the requirements of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which require
it to obtain an order allowing a deposition to be taken by other than stenographic means. See
N.M. R. Crim. P. 29(e)(3). The court held the contentions to be without merit.
The court first addressed the constitutional claim. Acknowledging that the constitution provides that an accused has the right to face his accuser, the court noted that the right should be
interpreted in light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted. The court relied on Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) to show that there are exceptions to the general rule
that one must be available for cross-examination at trial:
[T]o prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted
in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination
and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity,
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
156 U.S. at 242-43. The court said that Mattox stands for the proposition that the general rule
of allowing for cross-examination at trial must sometimes give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case. Quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the
court noted that "cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest
secured by it is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination
may satisfy the clause even in the absence of physical confrontation." 95 N.M. at 448, 623
P.2d at 568. The Martinez court concluded that there were sufficient reasons of "public
policy" to justify the use of the taped deposition in the case: the deponent had died, and he was
the only eyewitness to the crime. 95 N.M. at 448, 623 P.2d at 568. The court further noted that
there was sufficient opportunity for cross-examination at the time of the deposition so that its
introduction did not run counter to the confrontation clause. Id. at 449, 623 P.2d at 569.
Though the court did not mention it, the use of a video-taped deposition might be even more
likely to insure that defendant's rights than would a stenographic deposition, because the jury
has the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor.
The defendant's second argument as to the videotaped deposition was that it was taken
without obtaining an order allowing the deposition to be taken by other than stenographic
means. The court considered that the sole question was whether the non-compliance with a
technical rule prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 449, 623 P.2d at 569. The defendant relied on
McGuinnes v. State, 92 N.M. 441, 589 P.2d 1032 (1979), State v. Berry, 86 N.M. 138, 520 P.2d
558 (Ct. App. 1974) and State v. Barela, 86 N.M. 104, 519 P.2d 1185 (Ct. App. 1974), for the
proposition that the rule dealing with use of depositions must be strictly construed. The court
agreed with the defendant's interpretation of the cases cited, but distinguished them by noting
that in none of those cases was there a sufficient showing that the deponents were outside or
absent from the jurisdiction, and that they could not be obtained by legal process. 95 N.M. at
449, 623 P.2d at 569. In Martinez, the deponent had died several months before the trial.
The court held that the provisions of Rule 29 are to insure that the use of inordinate means
of recording depositions will provide an accurate and trustworthy record. The court held that
the defendant was not prejudiced, because there was no showing that the record was not accurate and trustworthy. Id.
75. 95 N.M. at 447, 623 P.2d at 567. The murder took place in 1973. Proceedings were begun in 1977, before the 1978 statutory revisions.
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change of venue motion, or whether the trial court was vested with
discretion. Without analysis, the court decided that the particular
statute involved was §21-5-4, which vested the trial court with discretion. The court held that because there was no demonstration that
the denial was an abuse of the court's discretion, the denial of the
motion would not be reversed. 6
II. THEFT OFFENSES
The appellate courts of New Mexico and the Tenth Circuit considered a number of cases related to theft during the Survey year.
The courts interpreted several statutes, but primarily dealt with jury
instructions.
A. Larceny
In State v. Lopez (Lopez 1)7 and Lopez v. State (Lopez II), "Iboth
New Mexico appellate courts considered the trial court's failure to
include the element of "consent" in an instruction on larceny. 9 The
defendant was convicted of larceny and appealed. The defendant
contended that taking another's property "without consent" is an
essential element of larceny. Lack of consent was not included in the
instructions given to the jury.8" The defendant argued that this omission was reversible error.
In Lopez I, the New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that the
instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, the instruction did
not include "without consent of owner." Second, it did not state
that the taking was "felonious." 8 ' The court of appeals, however,
affirmed the trial court's giving the instruction, subject to review by
the New Mexico Supreme Court.8 2
76. 95 N.M. at 448, 623 P.2d at 568.
77. 94 N.M. 349, 610 P.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1980) (Lopez I).
78. 94 N.M.341,610 P.2d 745 (1980) (Lopez II).
79. The statute reads: "Larceny consists of the stealing of anything of value which belongs
to another." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
80. The instruction given was N.M. U.J.l. Crim. 16.00:
For you to find the defendant guilty of larceny [as charged in Count . . .],
the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
following elements of the crime:
1.The defendant took and carried away [describe property], belonging to another, [which had a market value over $ . . ;
2. At the time he took this property, the defendant intended to permanently
deprive the owner of it;
3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the . . . day of . . . 19 . . .
81. 94 N.M. at 352, 610 P.2d at 756.
82. This case was apparently certified to the supreme court by the court of appeals under
N.M. Stat. Ann. §34-5-14(C) (1978) and Rules of Appellate Procedure for Criminal Cases,
Rule 406.
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In Lopez I, the New Mexico Supreme Court also affirmed the
trial court, but for different reasons. The court stated that the committee commentary after Uniform Jury Instruction-Criminal 16.00
(the instruction given at trial) equated the intent to deprive the owner
of property with a taking without consent. The court noted that Instruction 16.00 was given in conjunction with Uniform Jury Instruction-Criminal 1.50,83 which is the general criminal intent instruction. The court quoted from the committee commentary from
Instruction 16.00: "The committee believed that the element of trespassory taking was covered by this instruction together with the instruction on general criminal intent, Instruction 1.50."" The court
then set out Instruction 1.50, and noted that that instruction is to be
given for every crime except first and second degree murder. Without further comment, the court held that "U.J.I. Crim. 16.00 and
U.J.I. Crim. 1.50, given together, correctly state the law applicable
to larceny." 8
This holding does not take into account the different statutory
definitions for theft in New Mexico. Some of the New Mexico theft
statutes require a specific intent; 8 6 in others, no specific intent is required.8 7 It is not clear from the Lopez H opinion whether Uniform
83. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 1.50:
In addition to the other elements of [identify crime or crimes] the state must
prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted
intentionally when he committed the crime. A person acts intentionally when he
purposely does an act which the law declares to be a crime, even though he may
not know that his act is unlawful. Whether the defendant acted intentionally may
be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances, such as the manner in
which he acts, the means used, [and] his conduct [and any statements made by
him.]
For an in-depth analysis of instruction 1.50, see Romero, New Mexico Mens Rea Doctrinesand
the Uniform CriminalJury Instructions, 8 N.M. L. Rev. 127 (1978).
84. 94 N.M. at 342,610 P.2d at 746 (emphasis by the court is deleted).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-3 (1978): "Burglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure . . . with the intent to
commit any felony or theft therein." (emphasis added), and its corresponding instruction,
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 16.20, which provides: "[Tihe state must prove to your satisfaction beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime: 1. The defendant entered . . .
without authorization or permission; 2. When the defendant entered . . . he intended to
commit" [a felony or theft therein]" . . . (emphasis added). The committee commentary to
the instruction does not contain a reference to U.J.I. 1.50.
87. See, e.g., the robbery statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-2 (1978): Robbery consists of the
theft of anything of value from the person of another or from the immediate control of
another, by use of or threatened use of force or violence" and its corresponding instruction,
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 16.10:
1) The defendant took and carried away . . . from . . . , or from his immediate control intending to permanently deprive . . . of the property; . . .
2) The defendant took the . . . by [force or violence] [or] [threatened force or
violence]; . . . (emphasis added).
Unlike U.J.l. 16.00, this instruction's commentary does not include a reference to U.J.I. 1.50.
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Jury Instruction-Criminal 1.50, when given in conjunction with
any of the theft instructions besides larceny, will sufficiently state
the law applicable to those crimes.
B. Robbery
In United States v. Lewis, " the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the intent requirement of the federal bank robbery statute.8 9 In Lewis, the defendant was an alcoholic who had previously
been in federal prison. The evidence indicated that Lewis was unable
to cope with life outside prison. He.decided to rob a bank so that he
would be returned to prison. Lewis discussed his plans with a local
detective, an FBI agent, and various others. Lewis carried out his
plans, and was apprehended in the foyer of the bank. At trial, Lewis
tendered an instruction which, if given, would have required that
Lewis have the specific intent to steal.9" The trial court refused the
instruction. Instead, the court instructed the jury that upen entering
the bank, Lewis must have had "the specific intent to commit in the
bank a felony affecting the bank. .

..

,,I, Lewis was convicted of a

violation of 18 U.S.C. §2113(a), the federal bank robbery statute,
and was sentenced to ten years in prison.
Lewis appealed, attacking the intent instruction given at trial.
Lewis argued that his intent to commit the robbery in order to be
caught and put back in prison was not an intent to permanently separate the bank from its money. Therefore, he did not have the specific
intent required by the Bank Robbery Act, and the instruction given
at trial was wrong. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. 92
Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-16-14, which has no instruction and no requirement of intent.
Larceny and robbery are generally considered to be specific intent crimes because of the statutory language. An argument can be made that all theft offenses are specific intent crimes, because they all include intent to permanently deprive.
88. 628 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. 18 U.S.C. §2113(a) (1976) reads, in pertinent part:
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit
union or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank
• . . anyfelony affecting such bank, credit union or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larcenyShall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(emphasis added).
90. This is a curious development, considering that Lewis's plan was to rob a bank.
91. 628 F.2d at 1278.
92. The court distinguished the first paragraph of §2113(a), which does not require felonious intent:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other
things of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or
possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association . . .
18 U.S.C. §2113(a) (1976). The court noted that the offense is so "unamibguously dangerous
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The court noted that the Bank Robbery Act merely required specific
intent to commit a felony within the bank. Defendant's motives for
forming that intent were irrelevant. Therefore, the instruction was
appropriate as given at trial.
Lewis also argued that he was entitled to a necessity defense. 3 The
court refused to give an instruction on the necessity defense. The appellate court found this proper, pointing out that the defense could
only be available in case of "absolute and uncontrollable necessity;
. . . established beyond a reasonable doubt."" The court stated
that "necessity" does not arise-from a choice of several courses of
action. The court noted that there were several options other than
bank robbery available to Lewis, and held that the necessity defense
was, therefore, not available to him.
C. Burglary
The two burglary cases decided during the Survey year also involved jury instructions. In State v. Ruiz, 5 the defendant requested
an instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser offense necessarily included within burglary. The instruction apparently identified trespass as either entering or remaining on the property of the victim.
The trial court refused the instruction because there was no evidence
of malicious intent, which is required for criminal trespass. The
defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's refusal of the instruction. The court of appeals noted that the trial court did not err
in refusing the requested instruction "because it was not a correct
statement of the law." 6 The court considered the words "remaining
on" in the instruction to be wrong because a person can commit a
burglary without remaining on the property. 7 Because the case was
to others that the requisite mental intent is necessarily implicit in that description." 628 F.2d at
1279, quoting United States v. De Leo, 422 F.2d 487, 491 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1037 (1970). In De Leo, the court specifically noted that paragraph 2 of §2113(a) and paragraph (b) of the statute required felonious intent, but that the other paragraphs of §2113 did
not. The De Leo court stated that it was immaterial, because of the danger, to require felonious
intent to steal under §2113(a): "the crime is his resort to force and violence, or intimidation, in
the presence of another person to accomplish his purposes." 422 F.2d at 491.
93. 628 F.2d at 1279.
94. Id. The reason for this strict rule is the possibility of fraud should a looser rule be applied. It would be difficult for the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to be met, however,
if the defendant cannot put on psychological witnesses. In Lewis, the court refused to allow the
defendant's psychologist witness to answer a hypothetical question concerning the defendant's
belief that the robbery was the only way Lewis could prevent inevitable harm to himself and
others. The opinion gives no reason why the psychologist was not permitted to answer the
question.
95. 94 N.M. 771,617 P.2d 160 (Ct. App. 1980).
96. Id. at 778, 617 P.2d at 167.
97. It is curious that when the criminal trespass statute reads "entering or remaining," see
note 77 infra, that an instruction which contains that language is not a correct statement of the
law.
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to be remanded for a new trial on other grounds, the court of appeals then set out to discuss the elements of criminal trespass as a
lesser offense necessarily included within burglary.
The court stated the general rule that the question of whether a
lesser offense is included in the greater is answered by deciding
whether the greater offense can be committed without also committing the lesser. The court then compared the burglary statute" and
the criminal trespass statute" to see whether criminal trespass, based
only on entry, is a lesser included offense of burglary of a dwelling
house. The court concluded that it was. The analysis fell into three
parts.
1) Unauthorized/Unlawful
The court noted that burglary of a dwelling house requires "unauthorized entry." The criminal trespass statute requires "unlawful
entry with knowledge that consent is denied or withdrawn.""'° The
court reasoned that an unlawful entry is an entry not authorized by
law,"' and concluded that the "unauthorized entry" required for
burglary includes the knowledge that there is no consent to enter,
which is required for criminal trespass. Therefore, as far as criminal
trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary is concerned, "unauthorized entry" is the same as "unlawful entry."
2) Dwelling House/Land
The burglary statute forbids entry of a dwelling, while the criminal trespass statute forbids entry of the lands of another. '0 2 The Ruiz
court rejected the state's argument that burglary of a dwelling could
be committed without entering the lands of another. The court reasoned that "lands" in the criminal trespass statute included buildings and fixtures, and decided that when one enters another's dwelling house, he has also entered another's lands.' 0 3
3) Intent
The burglary statute requires an entry with intent to commit a fel98. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-16-3 (1978): "Burglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any
... dwelling or other structure, moveable or immoveable, with the intent to commit any
felony or theft therein."
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-14-1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1980): "Criminal trespass consists of unlawfully, and with malicious intent, entering or remaining on the lands of another knowing that
such consent to enter or remain is denied or withdrawn by the owner or occupant thereof."
100. Id.
101. 94 N.M. at 779, 617 P.2d at 168.
102. See notes 98 and 99 supra.
103. The court specifically excluded vehicles, watercraft and aircraft from this analysis. 94
N.M. at 779, 617 P.2d at 168.
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ony therein. The criminal trespass statute requires malicious intent.
The court stated that in this context, malicious intent means hatred
or ill will.' 0 "Ill will imports a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another
person or an intent to do a wrongful act.' '0 I The court then equated
"intent to commit a felony or theft" in the burglary statute with "ill
will" (malicious intent) required in the criminal trespass statute.
In light of those three considerations, the court concluded that
criminal trespass is a necessarily included lesser offense in burglary
of a dwelling house. One cannot commit burglary of a dwelling
house without committing criminal trespass as well.
A second case decided during the Survey year was State v. Brewster. "07 The court of appeals again considered the trial court's refusal
to give the defendant's requested criminal trespass instruction. The
trial court refused the instruction in Brewster on the ground that if
the defendant had no intent to steal, there could be no malicious intent to support a theory of criminal trespass.
Without much discussion, the court of appeals cited State v.
Ruiz' °8 and held that the trial court erred in refusing the instruction,
"because there was evidence that the malicious intent necessary to
support criminal trespass was defendant's intention to commit the
wrongful act of searching the papers contained in the residence without permission or legal justification for doing so." 0 9
After Ruiz and Brewster, the law in New Mexico is clear that criminal trespass is a lesser offense necessarily included within burglary
of a dwelling. Thus, any time a burglary instruction is given in the
context of a dwelling house, a criminal trespass instruction must also
be given.
106

D. Stolen Property
Two cases during the Survey period dealt with stolen property.
The first, a federal case, is actually a federal jurisdiction case. The
authors felt, however, that the case should be included. I10 The second, a state case, concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to estab104. Id.
105. Id.
106. This reasoning underlies the court of appeals' disagreement with the trial court's finding that there was no evidence of malicious intent in Ruiz. The court of appeals stated that evidence of intent to commit a felony was also evidence of malicious intent.
107. 94 N.M. 783, 617 P.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1980).
108. 94 N.M. 771, 617 P.2d 160 (Ct. App. 1980). See text accompanying notes 73-82 supra.
109. Id. at 783, 617 P.2d at 172.
110. The main reason for including the case was that it would not be reported in any other
Survey issue article. Another reason was the court's treatment of the interstate element in the
case.
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lish the element of knowledge in a charge of receiving stolen property in New Mexico.
1) Federal jurisdiction
In United States v. O'Connor, ' the defendant was charged with
aiding and abetting interstate transportation of stolen goods" 2 and
with conspiracy to transport stolen property in interstate commerce." 3 O'Connor was a "finder" -a person who puts a buyer and
a seller together for a fee. One of his deals involved his efforts to sell
uranium oxide, U-308 (yellowcake). A prospective buyer became
suspicious and notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI
was present at the sale and seized the barrels of yellowcake, which
had been stolen in New Mexico by Lucero, one of the sellers.
In a second transaction, O'Connor agreed to find a buyer for
more of Lucero's New Mexico yellowcake. O'Connor contacted
Marko (who turned out to be an FBI undercover agent). Through
Marko, O'Connor arranged a sale with an FBI agent. The parties
met in New Mexico. Final payment was to be made after the uranium was assayed in El Paso, Texas. The sellers were arrested in El
Paso.
O'Connor was convicted of both aiding and abetting and conspiracy. On appeal, O'Connor challenged the jurisdiction of the federal court. He argued that the interstate element of his offenses was
manufactured by the FBI. O'Connor relied on United States v.
Archer'" for the proposition that Congress did not intend to grant
federal jurisdiction over cases in which "federal officers themselves
supplied the interstate element and acted to ensure that an interstate
element would be present.""' ' 5 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
distinguished Archer, saying that that case dealt with "virtual entrapment.'"" 6 The court found that the federal agents in O'Connor
did not solicit the theft of the yellowcake. Nor, said the court, was
the interstate activity an "incidental aspect" of the transaction.' 7
Rather, the assaying of the ore in El Paso" was an "integral . . .
111. 635 F.2d 814(10th Cir. 1980).
112. 18 U.S.C. §2314 (1976) and 18 U.S.C. §2 (1976).
113. 18 U.S.C. §371 (1976).
114. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
115. 635 F.2d at 817, quoting United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 682.
116. 635 F.2d at 817.
117. Id. at 818. Cf. United States v. Archer, supra note 114, where interstate telephone calls
were too "casual and incidental" to allow federal jurisdiction in the case.
118. The court noted that there was substantial evidence that the yellowcake was to be delivered, as well as assayed, in El Paso.
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aspect of the transaction.'"" The court agreed with the defendant's
argument that in grounding federal jurisdiction on an interstate
nexus, the courts must avoid "alter[ing sensitive federal-state relationships through usurpation of state control over local matters,"' 2
but found that danger not present in O'Connor. The court held that
jurisdiction was properly asserted by the trial court, because federal
agents did not entrap the defendant, and because the interstate element was an integral part of the transaction.
2) Knowledge in Receiving Stolen Property
In State v. Olloway,' 2 ' the New Mexico Court of Appeals, pursuant to the New Mexico statute, considered the sufficiency of the
evidence needed to establish the element of "knowledge" in a charge
of receiving stolen property. 22 At trial, eight state witnesses testified
that certain of their possessions, including television sets, stereos,
and casette tape players, had been stolen. Police officers testified
that these goods were seized in the defendant's apartment. The police, however, were unable to testify with certainty that the defendant knew that the goods were stolen. The defendant was convicted,
and he appealed. The defendant challenged his conviction, apparently on the ground that the "knowledge" element was not supported by sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. Possession of
the goods was not disputed. 2 3
In New Mexico, mere possession of stolen property is not sufficient to warrant a conviction on a charge of receiving stolen property.' 24 Knowledge that the goods are stolen, however, can be established through circumstantial evidence.' 2 Possession of stolen
property, if not satisfactorily explained,' 26 is a "circumstance to be
119. 635 F.2dat818.
120. Id., quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
121. 95 N.M. 167, 619 P.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, Oct. 6, 1980.
122. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-16- 1I(A) (1978): "A. Receiving stolen property means intentionally to receive, retain or dispose of stolen property knowing it has been stolen or believing ithas
been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with intent to restore it to
the owner." (emphasis added).
123. The court of appeals seemingly had no strong feelings about this case. It first proposed
summary affirmance and the defendant objected. The court then proposed summary reversal
and the state objected.95 N.M. at 168, 619 P.2d at 844.
124. See State v. Elam, 86 N.M. 595, 526 P.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 86 N.M.
593, 526 P.2d 187 (1974).
125. State v.Lindsey, 81 N.M. 173, 464 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 81 N.M.
140, 464 P.2d 559 (1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
126. Defendants may be tempted to argue that this requirement raises fifth amendment
problems. Possession must be "satisfactorily explained" or circumstantial evidence may be
used to prove knowledge that the property was stolen. This might require the defendant to
decide whether to take the stand and explain, or forfeit his explanation, should he decide to ex-
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taken into consideration with all of the other facts and circumstances
in the case. ....
127
For example, in State v. Elam, '28 the defendant
was convicted of receiving books stolen from the University of New
Mexico Zimmerman Library. The jury considered, among other
things, the defendant's aliases, his possession of an embosser which
would obliterate the university seals in the books, and the five different stories the defendant told about the acquisition of the books.
The court in Elam found these circumstances to be sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The court in Oltoway decided that possession, coupled with the
sheer numbers of items stolen on various dates, and the fact that
some of the items were duplicates, could lead "a rational trier of fact
• . . [to find a] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with
regard to each essential element (possession and knowledge) of receiving stolen property."' 29 The court affirmed the conviction.
Olloway suggests that a wide variety of circumstances will be considered sufficient to prove the element of knowledge that property is
stolen. The jury can consider evidence of the defendant's suspicious
conduct, as in Elam, and such things as the number and duplication
of the items, as in Olloway. It is arguable that the burden on the
prosecutor is lightened when he has such a wide scope of evidence to
present.
E. Fraud
The New Mexico Court of Appeals considered two cases involving
fraud and related issues during the survey period. The first, State v.
Ellenberger,,30 was one of several cases arising out of the basketball
scandal at the University of New Mexico. The court held that a university basketball coach is not a public official, and is not, therefore,
ercise his right not to take the stand. In New Mexico, however, it has been held that similar decisions are tactical decisions and do not violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights. See,
e.g., State v. DeSantos, 91 N.M. 428, 575 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1978) (decision to testify at first
trial did not bar use of his testimony at second trial); State v. Smith, 88 N.M. 541, 543 P.2d 834
(Ct. App. 1975) (in applying alibi rule, trial court did not violate defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination); State v. Lindsey, 81 N.M. 173, 464 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied,
81 N.M. 140, 464 P.2d 559 (1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970) (trial court's refusal to
suppress evidence of prior convictions after defendant decided to take the stand to explain
away the possession of the stolen goods was not error).
127. 95 N.M. at 168, 619 P.2d at 844, quoting State v. Follis, 67 N.M. 223, 223, 354 P.2d
521, 521-22 (1960). In Follis, there was a total lack of circumstantial evidence to show the requisite knowledge. Therefore, the conviction was reversed.
128. 86 N.M. 595, 526 P.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1974).
129. 95 N.M. at 168-69, 619 P.2d at 844-45.
130. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 109 (Dec. 9, 1980), rev'd, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 606, 629 P.2d 1216
(1981).
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within the ambit of the false voucher statute. The second case, State
v. Stettheimer, , ' involved a real estate transaction. The defendant's
conviction was upheld.
In State v. Ellenberger, the University of New Mexico head
basketball coach was charged with ten counts of fraud under the
New Mexico criminal fraud statute' 3 2 and 12 counts of making or
permitting false public vouchers contrary to §30-23-3 of the New
Mexico criminal laws. 3 3 The trial court dismissed all counts brought
under §30-23-3, because that statute only applied to public officials,
and a university basketball coach is a public employee, not a public
official. The state appealed the dismissal. The court of appeals
agreed with the trial court. The court of appeals construed § 30-23-3
to exclude basketball coaches and affirmed the dismissal of the
charges.
The court of appeals looked at the history of the statute and noted
that the current article containing the statute in question is entitled
"Misconduct by Officials." 3 The court noted that the predecessor
to the current statute had been applicable to "any person" who
made a false voucher,' 35 but that §30-23-3 eliminated the "any person" language from the law. The current statute, therefore, is more
limited and only applies to officials.
The court of appeals then considered the meaning of the word
"officials" to determine if a basketball coach came within the purview of the statute. The court noted that all the other pertinent sections of Article 23 of the New Mexico Code referred to both public
officers and public employees.' 36 The court noted that New Mexico
131. 94 N.M. 149, 607 P.2d 1167 (Ct. App. 1980).
132. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-16-6 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
133. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-23-3 (1978). The statute reads:
Making or permitting false public voucher consists of knowingly, intentionally
or willfully making, causing to be made or permitting to be made, a false material statement or forged signature upon any public voucher, or invoice supporting a public voucher, with intent that the voucher or invoice shall be relied upon
for the expenditure of public money.
Whoever commits making or permitting false public voucher is guilty of a
fourth degree felony.
134. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 110. See State v. Thurman, 88 N.M. 31, 536 P.2d 1087 (Ct.
App. 1975), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975) which held that § 30-23-3 applies
only to public officials.
135. See Pollack v. Montoya, 55 N.M. 390, 234 P.2d 336 (1951), where the court held that
the appointed Chief of the Division of Liquor Control (now Alcoholic Beverage Control) was a
public "officer." See also State v. Quinn, 35 N.M. 62, 290 P. 786 (1930), where the court held
that an equipment engineer for the State Highway Department was not a state "officer" within
the meaning of the bribery statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-2802 (Comp. 1929).
136. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-23-1 (1978): "Demanding illegal fees consists of any
public official or public employee knowingly asking or accepting anything of value greater
than that fixed or allowed by law.
... (emphasis added); N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-23-2 pro-
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makes a distinction between public officers and public employees,
and concluded that the absence of a reference to public employees in
§30-23-3 precluded application of that statute to public employees.' 3 7 Because Ellenberger was a public employee and not a public
official, the court of appeals held that the trial court properly dismissed the charges under § 30-23-3.
In an opinion handed down after the Survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The supreme court
held that the statute was unambiguous in its application to both
public employees and public officials. Therefore, the court of appeals' analysis of legislative intent was unnecessary. The court found
that Ellenberger was properly charged under the statute.' 38
The supreme court then turned to the question of whether the
counts against Ellenberger brought under this statute should be
merged with the fraud counts which arose out of the same criminal
acts. The court held that this issue was prematurely before it, beinterlocutory appeal, and there had been, as
cause the case was on
39

yet, no convictions.

In State v. Stettheimer, 140 the court of appeals considered the sufficiency of the evidence concerning fraud and attempted fraud. The
court also looked at a challenge to the failure of the trial court to
give a requested instruction. The two counts of Stettheimer's convictions were based on discrete sets of facts. The court affirmed the
convictions.
The defendant, a real estate agent, entered a contract with Ms.
Melear which authorized the defendant to sell Melear's house. The
property was appraised and listed for sale at $11,400. Mr. Mendez
offered to trade some apartments for Ms. Melear's house. Defendant and Mendez closed that transaction, for $14,000. The next day,
defendant telephoned Ms. Melear and offered to buy her house for
$10,200. The defendant did not tell Melear of the deal with Mendez
vides that "[niothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the payment of public funds
where such payments are intended to cover lawful remuneration to public officials or public
employees . . ." (emphasis added); N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-23-5 (1978): "Unlawful speculation
in claims against the state consists of any public official or public employee directly or indirectly buying, selling, . . ." (emphasis added); N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-23-6(A): "Any public
official or public employee receiving anything of value . . ." (emphasis added); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §30-23-7: "...
a public officer or public employee convicted of aviolation.
"(emphasis added).
137. The statute also is silent with respect to public officials. As the court noted, however,
the title of the article is "Misconduct by Officials."
138. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 606,608 (May 21, 1981), 629 P.2d 1216, 1218 (1981).
139. Id.
140. 94 N.M. 149, 607 P.2d 1167 (Ct. App. 1980).
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for $14,000. Under these facts, the defendant was convicted of
fraud.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the state failed to prove all
the elements of fraud. ,4 , Specifically, the defendant argued that his
mere silence concerning the $14,000 transaction did not amount to
"misrepresentation" in the criminal context. The court distinguished the cases relied upon by the defendant to support his proposition,' 42 and noted that the modern trend is that silence may form
the basis for criminal misrepresentation "where the defendant has a
legal duty to speak or where such silence is calculated to deceive.'"I"
The court said that the broad definition of the required criminal conduct in the New Mexico criminal fraud statute' 4 4 followed the modern trend.
With little additional discussion, the court referred to the defendant's fiduciary duty, and stated that there was substantial evidence
that the misrepresentation was both material and relied upon by Ms.
Melear. The conviction was affirmed. After Stettheimer, it appears
that silence, especially the silence of a fiduciary, can form the basis
of a criminal action for fraud in New Mexico.
F. Attempted Fraud
The attempted fraud charge against Stettheimer was based on
property contracts. The defendant and sellers signed two contracts
for the sale of the same piece of property. The first was for $16,000
(the negotiated sale price). The second, for $20,300, was drafted
with the intent to defraud the bank. The defendant applied to a bank
141. The instruction given at trial read:
For you to find the defendant guilty of fraud as charged in Count I, the State
must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following
elements of the crime:
I. The defendant, by any words or conduct, misrepresented a fact to Robbi
Melear, intending to deceive or cheat Robbie Melear;
2. Because of the misrepresentation and Robbie Melear's reliance on it, defendant obtained the sum of $2,960.00;
3. This sum of money belonged to someone other than Defendant; . ...
See 94 N.M. at 151, 607 P.2d at 1169 (emphasis added by the court).
Among other things, the defendant contended that the instruction specified money, and he
received no money, but a house. Therefore, the instruction reading "the sum of $2,960.00"
was the wrong instruction. The court noted that the instruction need not be exact. The factual
inconsistency of calling the fraudulently acquired increased value "money" and not property,
was considered to be irrelevant by the court.
142. Those cases were People v. Baker, 96 N.Y.. 340 (1884); Rogers v. People, 161 Colo.
317, 422 P.2d 377 (1966); McCorkle v. State, 170 Ark. 105, 278 S.W. 965 (1926).
143. 94 N.M. at 152,607 P.2d at 1170.
144. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-6 (Cum. Supp. 1981): "Fraud consists of the intentional misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices or representations."
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for financing, using the fraudulent $20,300 contract. The defendant
was to receive a loan commitment of $16,240 (80%-/ financing). The
loan was not completed because of title problems. The defendant
was convicted of attempted fraud. ,5
On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction with three arguments. First, the defendant argued that acquiring borrowed
money is not criminal fraud. The court of appeals dealt with the
defendant's first argument summarily: "The fraudulent obtainment
4 6
of a loan may be the basis for a conviction of criminal fraud."
The defendant's second contention was that in determining the degree of the offense, the court must look to the value of the credit
rather than the amount of money involved in the loan. Because no
evidence had been introduced as to the value of the loan, there was
no evidence that the defendant had attempted a felony. The court
characterized the defendant's second argument as a "clever game of
semantics."' 4 7 The court pointed out that the statute mandates that
the property has to be worth over $2,500 in order for there to be a
felony. " The defendant sought to acquire fraudulently an additional $3,440 from the bank, the court reasoned, and therefore he
had attempted the felony of fraud. According to the court, the
means of acquisition were irrelevant, so long as the acquisition was
the result of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations.
The defendant further asserted that his actions were mere preparation, and not an overt act in furtherance of committing a crime, so
he had not really attempted to commit a felony. The court dealt
somewhat more fully with this argument. The court noted that an action amounts to more than a preparation when there has been "some
overt act" in furtherance of execution of the crime. I" Furthermore,
the act must "amount to the commencement of the consumation [of
the crime]."' 0 Even slight acts in furtherance of the intent to com145. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-28-1 (1978): "Attempt to commit a felony consists of an overt act
in furtherance of and with intent to commit a felony and tending but failing to effect is commission."
146. 94 N.M. at 153,607 P.2d at 1171. Cf. State v. Thoreen, 91 N.M. 624, 578 P.2d 325 (Ct.
App. 1978), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978); State v. Schifani, 92 N.M. 127,
584 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978). Both Thoreen
and Schifani were cited by the court in Stetheimer.
147. 94N.M. at 153, 604 P.2d at 1171.
148. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-16-6 (Cum. Supp. 1981). There can also be a fraud of a lower
degree committed with a taking or misappropriation of property worth over $100 but less than
$2,500. Id.
149. 94 N.M. at 144-45, 607 P.2d at 1171-72, quoting State v. Lopez, 81 N.M. 107, 464
P.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 140, 464 P.2d 559 (1970). See State v. Trejo, 83
N.M. 511,494 P.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1972), which affirms the language in Lopez.
150. 94N.M. at 154, 607 P.2d at 1172.
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mit the crime will constitute an attempt. The court stated that "[tjo
present an offer to the bank, which constituted an element of the attempted crime (fraudulent misrepresentation), and then accept a
loan commitment based on the fraudulent document is a 'subsequent
step in a direct movement toward the commission of the offense.' "I' The5 2 court, therefore, affirmed the conviction of attempted fraud.'

G. Forgery
In State v. Smith, "' the New Mexico Court of Appeals construed
the New Mexico forgery statute, 5 4 holding that alteration of signed
bearer paper is forgery. In Smith, Higgins purchased auto parts
from Henderson-Baker Imports in Las Cruces and paid for the parts
with a check. Higgins left the payee's name blank on the check. Henderson-Baker Imports was then burglarized. Subsequently, the
defendant presented the check to Mr. Land in payment for goods.
Land wrote the name of his business in the payee blank, and required the defendant to put her name and telephone number on the
back of the check. The defendant wrote a fictitious name and number. The defendant was convicted of forgery and appealed.
The defendant argued that the check was bearer paper and was negotiated by delivery alone. Therefore, the fictitious name and
number was not a material alteration, which is an element of forgery.I 5 The court agreed that the check was indeed bearer paper and
was negotiable to all the world by delivery, although the payor had
intended it to be payable only to Henderson-Baker Imports. Citing
an Arizona case,' 6 the court said that the filling in of the payee
151. Id.
152. The defendant's argument that one of his instructions was improperly refused was also
rejected. The court held that U.J.I. Crim. 28.10 was correctly given without the defendant's
requested addition, which read: "[ylou are instructed that preparation to commit a crime not
followed by an overt act done toward its commission does not constitute an attempt." The
court reasoned that the instruction given at trial sufficiently stated the law, and the defendant's
requested instruction was repetitious.
153. 95 N.M. 432,622 P.2d 1052 (Ct. App. 1981).
154. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-10 (1978): Forgery consists of: A. Falsely making or altering
any signature to, or any part of, any writing purported to have any legal efficacy with intent to
injure or defraud; . . ."
155. Id. The court equated "altering" as prohibited by the statute with a "material alteration."
156. The court cited State v. Rovin, 21 Ariz. App. 260, 518 P.2d 579 (1974). The Rovin
opinion stated: "[ailteration of a document without authority to do so may constitute forgery
and such alteration may consist of insertion of matter in the document after it has been
signed." 21 Ariz. App. at 262, 518 P.2d at 580. The court in Smith, however, did not analyze
the case in terms of alteration without authorization, or in terms of insertion of new matter
after signature.
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blank constituted a material alteration.' 5 7 The court then reasoned
that Land was the agent of the defendant when he wrote the name of
his business on the check. Therefore, the defendant, through her
agent, had altered a writing purporting to have legal efficacy with an
intent to defraud. The court held that the defendant's acts constituted the crime of forgery under the New Mexico statute and affirmed the conviction.
The result reached by the court in Smith may be correct, but the
reasoning is incomplete. The court did not discuss how the filling in
of a different payee than the one intended by the payor was forgery.
Certainly, Smith did not "make" the check, as is prohibited by the
statute. Nor did she alter either the signature on the check or any
part of the writing which was already on the check. Although the
court implied, with its quotation from the Arizona case,'" that insertion of matter in the document after it has been signed can be an
"alteration" within the meaning of the New Mexico statute, the
court did not specifically say so. It would have been helpful if the
court had completed its analysis specifically to include that "alteration" can be insertion of new words in a blank space after the document has been signed.
III. OTHER CRIMES
A. Criminal Sexual Penetration
During the Survey year, New Mexico appellate courts handed
down two decisions concerning the crime of criminal sexual penetration (CSP). In State v. Larson'59 the New Mexico Supreme Court
upheld the relatively new criminal sexual penetration statutes' 0
against a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness. State v. Garcia''
discussed the difficult question of psychological examination of a
rape victim, and granted a new trial because no examination was
made.
In Larson, the defendant was charged with coercing his fifteenyear-old sister-in-law and his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter into
157. The court stated that the filling in of the payee blank restricted the negotiability of the
check by restricting it to a single payee. 95 N.M. at 433, 622 P.2d at 1053.
158. See note 132 supra.
159. 94 N.M. 795, 617 P.2d 1310 (1980).
160. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-1 to -16 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981). These statutes represent a
major change from earlier New Mexico laws prohibiting the less well-defined crime of rape.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-9-1 to -19 (1953).
161. 94 N.M. 583, 613 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 299, 621 P.2d 516

(1980).
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performing sexual acts with him. He was convicted under N.M. Stat.
Ann. §30-9-11 (1978), which reads:
Criminal sexual penetration is the unlawful and intentional
causing of a person, other than one's spouse, to engage in sexual
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse, or the
causing of penetration, to any extent and with any object, of the
genital or anal openings of another, whether or not there is any
emission.
Larson argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it
fails to define the word "unlawful." The defendant claimed that this
failure made it impossible to know if a sexual act was lawful or unlawful penetration. Therefore, the statute might be inconsistently
and arbitrarily enforced. 6 2
The court rejected these arguments for two reasons. First, the
court said that the statute must be read in its entirety. I63 The subsections of §30-9-11 define first, second, and third degree CSP, and include in those definitions a requirement of force or coercion. A person of ordinary intelligence, 6 therefore, would be on notice of what
was meant by the term "unlawful." 65 The second point made by the
court was that a statute is not susceptible to a vagueness attack
merely because a hypothetical case might be created where applicability of the statute might be questionable. 166
The indictment in State v. Garcia'67 charged ten sexual offenses.
The defendant was convicted of five. Before trial, the defendant
moved for an order requiring the complaining witness to submit to a
psychological examination. The motion was denied, and the defendant argued on appeal that the denial was reversible error. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals agreed, and remanded the case for a new
trial.
The Garcia decision may be so tied to its particular facts that it
sheds no light on the difficult question of psychological examination
of the complaining witness in a rape case. The court in Garciamade
an attempt to emphasize the narrowness of its holding. In Garcia,
the state relied on "mental anguish" as part of the personal injury
which raised the crime from third to second degree CSP. The state,
162. 94 N.M. at 796, 617 P.2d at 1311.
163. Id.
164. See State v. Najera, 89 N.M. 522, 554 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1976).
165. The court also pointed out that the word "unlawful" has been defined in New Mexico
as "without excuse or justification." See Territory v. Gonzales, 14 N.M. 31, 89 P. 250 (1907).
166. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), which deals with both issues.
167. 94 N.M. 583, 613 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 299, 621 P.2d 516
(1980).
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therefore, established the relevancy of the psychological state of the
complaining witness, and discovery with regard to that element of its
case was also relevant.
Once psychiatric testimony has been admitted at all, however, it
will be difficult to prevent its use for purposes which are irrelevant
or prejudicial. A psychiatric examination might require an exploration of the prior sex life of the complaining witness, for example, or
might touch upon his or her mental condition before the alleged
crime, which would lead to an argument on the issue of consent.
Garciamay serve as a warning to the state not to rely on "mental anguish" as a personal injury in CSP cases. If the state does so rely, it
may open the door to unwanted psychiatric examination. '68
B. Battery and Assault
The New Mexico courts decided two cases during the Survey year
involving battery or assault against a peace officer. State v. Rhea'69
discussed the question whether a conviction of battery on a peace officer 7 was precluded by the existence of a more specific statute
covering the offense. State v. Andazola'7 ' rejected a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness which was directed at the statute which prohibits resisting or obstructing an officer.' 7 2
In State v. Rhea, 3 the defendant was convicted of battery upon a
peace officer"' for hitting a jailer. The court of appeals summarily
reversed on two grounds. The first ground was that the specific
crime of assault by a prisoner' covered the case. Where both a gen168. This holding may give rise to an interesting question concerning the privacy right of a
victim in a CSP case. The victim may not wish to undergo a psychiatric examination. Under
Garcia, however, the victim may be forced to, if the state has made an allegation of "mental
anguish" an important part of its case. Forcing a victim to submit to such testing may violate
constitutional privacy interests. As a practical matter, such a case may never arise. It is difficult
to imagine that a district attorney will inflict an unwanted ordeal on the complaining witness,
merely to raise the CSP charge from a fourth to a third degree felony.
Testimony about prior sexual conduct is generally excluded by Rule 412 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, in an effort to prevent courtroom harassment and humiliation of the rape victim.
For an extensive discussion of the question, see Ireland, Reform Rape Legislation: A New
Standardof Sexual Responsibility, 49 U. Colo. L. Rev. 185 (1978).
169. 94 N.M. 168, 608 P.2d 144 (1980).
170. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-24 (1978).
171. 95 N.M. 430, 622 P.2d 1050 (1981).
172. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
173. 94 N.M. 168, 608 P.2d 144 (1980).
174. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-24(A) (1978) defines battery upon a peace officer as: "[Tihe
unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of a peace officer while he
is in the lawful discharge of his duties, when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner."
175. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-17 (1978) defines assault by a prisoner as intentionally:
A. placing an officer or employee of any penal institution, reformatory, jail
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eral and a specific statute condemn the same acts, it is error to prosecute under the general statute.' 7 6 The second ground for summary
reversal was that, in the opinion of the court of appeals, a jailer is
not a "peace officer." The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.
The supreme court held that the summary reversal procedure was
inappropriate, because factual determinations were necessary before
it could be decided which of the two statutes better fitted the case.
The court further held that the two statutes did not stand in the relation of general to specific. '" The supreme court quoted the statutory
definition of "peace officer"' 7 8 and pointed out that all that was required for a person to come under that definition was a duty vested
by law "to maintain public order."' 7 9
In State v. Andazola, defendant allegedly used a large dog in an
assault on peace officers. The officers were called by Andazola's
girlfriend, who appeared to have been injured in the course of an
argument with Andazola. Rather than talk to the police when they
arrived, Andazola walked over to stand beside a large, vicious dog.
He then unhitched the dog and went inside the girlfriend's trailer.
The girlfriend screamed for help and the officers summoned other
officers. Sometime thereafter, the dog was shot by the police. The
or prison farm or ranch, or a visitor therein, in apprehension of an immediate
battery likely to cause death or bodily harm;
B. causing or attempting to cause great bodily harm to an officer or employee
of any penal institution, reformatory, jail or prison farm or ranch, or a visitor
therein; or
C. confining or restraining an officer or employee of any penal institution, reformatory, jail or prison farm or ranch, or a visitor therein, with intent to use
such person as a hostage.
176. See State v. Riley, 82 N.M. 235, 478 P.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1970).
177. The court did not detail precisely how the crimes differ. It merely quoted the language
of each statute (see notes 174, 175 supra). The court emphasized "great bodily harm"; this
may indicate that the court saw the crime of assault by a prisoner as more serious than that of
battery on a police officer.
178. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-1-2(C) (1978): "[Alny public official or public officer vested by
law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes; . . ."(emphasis added by the court).
In one other survey year case, peace officer status was important. City of Alamogordo v.
Ohlrich, 95 N.M. 725, 625 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1981), concerned a disorderly conduct conviction where defendant had made abusive and insulting remarks to a police officer. The definition of disorderly conduct involved a "present danger of violence" and a likelihood of provok" Section 6-2-8 of the codified
ing "an immediate violent reaction in an average person ..
ordinances of Alamogordo. The court of appeals held that a peace officer is not an "average
person" for purposes of the ordinance. It is part of the duty vested by law in a peace officer
that he use restraint in dealing with the public.
179. 94 N.M. at 169, 608 P.2d at 145. Other jurisdictions have also arrived at the conclusion
that a jailer is a police officer. See Schalk v. Dep't of Admin., 42 Cal. App. 2d 624, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 92 (1974); Kimball v. County of Santa Clara, 24 Cal. App. 3d 780, 101 Cal. Rptr. 353
(1972); State v. Grant, 102 N.J. Super. 164, 245 A.2d 528 (1968).
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defendant was arrested and accused of aggravated assault on a peace
officer.' 80 He was convicted of the lesser offense of resisting or
obstructing an officer. 8 ' Defendant appealed, arguing that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, both
on its face and as applied to his case.
The court of appeals quickly disposed of the argument that the
statute is vague on its face. The court stated that the "clear simple
language" ' 2 of the statute puts all persons of common intelligence
on notice of when they would be exposed to criminal sanctions.
The contention that the statute was vague as applied to the defendant was based on a reading of the jury's verdict. The defendant
argued that the failure to convict on the greater crime of assault
meant that the jury had decided that he was not using the dog as a
weapon. As the court of appeals pointed out, it is difficult to understand how that argument constitutes a claim of vagueness. In any
event, the court refused to base its own opinion of the case on speculation about the decision-making processes of the jury. The court
stated that it is mere conjecture what the jury may have believed, and
it would be intolerable if the jury's verdict could be looked behind
for purposes of appeal.
C. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
In State v. Cuevas, ,83
the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a
court of appeals decision construing the statute which prohibits contributing to the delinquency of a minor. ' Cuevas, a high school
teacher, was invited to a party given by some of his minor students.
There was liquor at the party and Cuevas demonstrated how tequila
is drunk with salt and lemon. Cuevas was convicted of contributing
and sentenced to three consecutive one-to-five-year terms in the state
penitentiary. He was convicted under a general statute which makes
it a felony to contribute to the delinquency of a minor." 5 Cuevas appealed, claiming that it was error to convict under a general statute,
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-22(A)(1) (1978).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
95 N.M.at 431,622 P.2d at 1051.
94 N.M.792, 617 P.2d 1307 (1980).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-3 (1978).
This statute provides:
Contributing to delinquency of minor consists of any person committing any
act, or omitting the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes, or
tends to cause or encourage the delinquency of any person under the age of eighteen years.
Whoever commits contributing to delinquency of minor is guilty of a fourth
degree felony.
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where a more specific statute existed which made it a violation of the
Liquor Control Act to encourage a minor to drink.' 8 6 The court of
appeals agreed and reversed the conviction.' 8 7 The supreme court
granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.
As in State v. Rhea, discussed above,' 88 the disagreement between
the court of appeals and the supreme court in Cuevas turned on
whether the two statutes actually stood in the relationship of general
to specific. The court of appeals concluded that the two statutes
stood in such a relationship, based on the purposes of the two statutes. According to the court of appeals, the purpose in both is to
protect the minor. 89 Therefore, the court reasoned, one is merely a
more specific form of the other.
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals' approach and
held that the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is
separate and distinct from the violation of the Liquor Control Act.
The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to repeal the
contributing statute, because it would be rare for there to be no
statute prohibiting the act which allegedly contributed to the delinquency of the minor. The supreme court disagreed that the purpose
of the two statutes is the same. According to that court, the purpose
of the contributing statute is to protect children from harmful adult
behavior. '9 0 The court stated that the purpose behind the liquor laws
has a different emphasis, although the two may overlap to some ex-

tent. 19'
The supreme court went on to address an issue which was not discussed by the court of appeals-that of merger. Cuevas had been
convicted of three separate counts of contributing, all based on the
186. N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-10-16(A)(4) (1978) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §607B-1.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1981):
A. It is a violation of the Liquor Control Act . . . for any club, retailer, dispenser or any other person, except a parent or guardian or adult spouse of any
minor, or adult person into whose custody any court has committed the minor
for the time, outside of the actual, visible, personal presence of the minor's
parent, guardian or adult spouse or the adult person into whose custody any
court has committed the minor for the time, to do any of the following acts:
(4) to aid or assist a minor to buy, procure or be served with alcoholic liquor.
187. State v. Cuevas, 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 350 (Ct. App. Apr. 17, 1980).
188. See text accompanying notes 145 through 155, supra.
189. In State v. Favela, 91 N.M. 476, 576 P.2d 282 (1978), the court held that the purpose of
the contributing statute is to protect children from harmful adult behavior. The purpose of the
liquor laws, as set out in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 60-3A-2 (1978) is more general: "[Allcoholic beverages shall be licensed, regulated, and controlled so as to protect the public health, safety and
morals of every community in the state; . . .
190. See note 189 supra.
191. 94 N.M. at 794, 617 P.2d at 1309. The court did not say what the different emphasis
was.
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same acts. The court found that the three convictions were both arbitrary and excessive. The court concluded that it was an arbitrary
decision to convict Cuevas of only three counts when at least twenty
minors attended the party. Additionally, the possibility of 15 years
in the penitentiary made the three counts seem excessive. The court
affirmed one conviction and remanded the other two convictions for
dismissal.' 9 2
D. Confinements and Escapes
Three cases were decided during the Survey period which involved
escapes from prison or the harboring of a fugitive. State v. Martin'9 3
held that an escape from the Chavez County Jail, where the defendant was being held pending arraignment for an offense committed
in the state penitentiary, could give rise to charges of "escape from
the penitentiary." 9 State v. Ellis'9 5 held that the defendant had the
burden of showing that his confinement was unlawful in order to
raise unlawfulness as a defense. Finally, State v. Rogers'96 held that
the statute prohibiting acts "in aid of" a fugitive from justice was
not unconstitutionally vague.
In Martin, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy, assault by a
prisoner, false imprisonment of a jailer, and escape from the penitentiary. The court of appeals considered the first and last of these
convictions on appeal. On the conspiracy charge, the defendant argued that the indictment failed to give him notice of the felony which
was the subject of the alleged conspiracy. The court rejected this
argument on two grounds. First, the court said the other counts of
the indictment which charged felonies were sufficient to give notice
of the felonies in question. Second, the defendant had failed to request a specification of the felonies underlying the conspiracy
charge. Therefore, he waived any claim that he did not know what
the claims were.
The defendant in Martin had been in the penitentiary until he was
192. The supreme court originally published the Cuevas opinion on June 24, 1980. On September 30, 1980, the court withdrew the June 24 opinion and substituted an opinion which is
substantially the same. The only difference is that the second opinion mentions and rejects
Cuevas' claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
193. 94 N.M. 251, 609 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545
(1980).
194. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-22-9(B) (1953) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-9(B)
(1978)).
195. 95 N.M. 427, 622 P.2d 1047 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 426, 622 P.2d 1046
(1981).
196. 94 N.M. 527, 612 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992
(1980).
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arrested for a narcotics offense and booked into the Chaves County
Jail until arraignment. The court order which provided for his transfer also provided that Martin would return to the penitentiary after
arraignment. Martin participated in an escape from the Chaves
County Jail. He was convicted of escape under Section 30A-22-9(B),
which reads:
Escape from the penitentiary consists of any person who shall
have been lawfully committed to the penitentiary:
A. Escaping or attempting to escape from such penitentiary;
or
B. escaping or attempting to escape from any other lawful
place of custody or confinement although not within the
confines of the penitentiary.
Whoever commits escape from penitentiary is guilty of a second
degree felony. 97
On the charge of "escape from the penitentiary," the defendant
argued that he was not under the control of the penitentiary when he
escaped. Therefore, he should be subject to the lesser charge of
escaping from jail. The supreme court held that, although there was
a change in the location of his physical confinement, defendant's
lawful custody or confinement was in the penitentiary. 9 8 The special
facts in Martin indicated to the court that physical confinement in
the county jail was in fact a penitentiary confinement. 9' 9
State v. Ellis"'° raised a question of evidentiary burdens. Ellis contended that the crime of "escape from the penitentiary '"20' carried a
necessary element that the confinement was lawful. The state made a
prima facie case that the defendant's incarceration was lawful. On
appeal, Ellis collaterally attacked the lawfulness of his commitment.
The court of appeals held that this attack was improper and could
only have been raised in the trial court below. The court analogized
the case to an habitual offender proceeding, where the defendant
must come forward, after he is arrested, with evidence of the invalidity of a prior conviction.202 Similarly, after the state in Ellis had
made a prima facie showing of a lawful commitment, the defendant
197.
198.
199.
200.
(1981).

N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-22-9(B) (1953) (currently N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-9(B) (1978)).
94 N.M. at 254, 609 P.2d at 336.
Id.
95 N.M. 427, 622 P.2d 1047 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 426, 622 P.2d 1046'

201. See text accompanying notes 174 through 176 supra.
202. In support of this proposition the court cited State v. Wildenstein, 91 N.M. 550, 577
P.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1978), State v. O'Neil, 91 N.M. 727, 580 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1978), and
State v. Lujan, 90 N.M. 778, 568 P.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1977).
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had the burden of coming forward with factual evidence to refute
that showing.
In State v. Rogers,2 3 the New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld a
statute against a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness. Rogers
falsely confessed to a killing which had been committed by a friend
of his. He made the confession for the purpose of effecting his
friend's release from prison. Rogers was convicted of harboring a
felon. The statute under which Rogers was convicted reads:
Harboring or aiding a felon consists of any person . . . who

knowingly conceals any offender or gives such offender any
other aid, knowing that he has committed a felony, with the intent that he escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. 20

Rogers argued that the phrase "any other aid" was too vague to
give him notice that the statute would apply to the giving of false
testimony. He further contended that he should have been prosecuted under either a New Mexico statute or an Albuquerque ordinance which specifically prohibits false testimony."'5 The court dealt
with the first of Rogers' contentions in a laconic fashion, merely
asserting that "[o]ne with common intelligence should have no difficulty understanding that knowingly confessing falsely to a crime, for
the purpose of permitting an arrested felon to be released and thus
escape 'trial, conviction or punishment,' is giving aid of a nature
precisely proscribed by the statute." 0 6
The court answered the defendant's second contention by focusing on the purpose of the harboring statute. 0 7 Neither of the enactments suggested by Rogers as more appropriate"0 8 emphasized the
crucial element of the crime of harboring a felon. The harboring
statute, the court said, is not concerned with a more serious crime
than the mere making of a false statement. Instead, it is concerned
with the intent to render assistance to a fugitive. According to the
court, it is this intent which merits the greater penalty of the harboring statute.
203. 94 N.M. 527, 612 P.2d 1338 (1980), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
204. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-4 (1978) (emphasis added by the court).
205. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-39-1 (1978); Alb. Ordinance 96-1973, §2-16.
206. 94 N.M. at 529, 612 P.2d at 1340.
207. Id.
208. Those enactments are N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-39-1 (1978) and Albuquerque Ordinance
96-1973, §2-16, which provide that false reporting to a law enforcement agency or officer is a
misdemeanor.
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E. Drug Cases
Two important cases were decided during the Survey year in the
area of controlled substances. State v. Smith2" 9 discussed the difficult problem of whether the doctrine of merger should apply where
different drugs were possessed by the defendant in the same transaction, and the state prosecuted for separate offenses. In State v.
Carr,2"' Judge Hernandez of the court of appeals carefully and exhaustively considered the complicated issue of how the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) 2 ' applies to physicians.
In Smith, the defendant was convicted of four counts of trafficking in narcotic drugs. The drugs were part of a single sale. The only
distinction between the counts of the indictment was that each count
concerned a different drug. The court of appeals found error in the
trial court's failure to merge the four counts. In a thoughtful opinion
by Justice Sosa, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and
reinstated the convictions.
The court explored New Mexico law on the "same evidence"
test '2 and the "included offense" test.2 3 Had the court found either
the same evidence would give rise to several convictions or one offense was necessarily included in the other, the trial court would
have held that all but one count was barred by double jeopardy." '
Absent such a finding, the court could not decide that merger was
mandated.
The important factors in the Smith decision were considerations
of policy. The court said that question of policy in cases of merger
override any purely mechanical test. The tests themselves, in fact,
are simply reflections of the policies of judicial economy and effi209. 94 N.M. 379, 610 P.2d 1208 (1980).
210. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 457 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1981).
211. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-1 to 30-31-40 (Repl. Pamp. 1980 & Supp. 1981).
212. The "same evidence test" was set out in State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813
(1975). The question to consider under that test is whether the same facts offered in support of
one offense would sustain a conviction of the other. If they would, the courts are merged.
213. The "one offense" test was set out in State v. Sandoval, 90 N.M. 260, 561 P.2d 1353
(Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977). Under this test, the court
must consider whether one offense necessarily involved the other, and whether the elements of
the two are the same. If the answer to these questions is affirmative, the counts merge.
214. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall
... This provi"be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
sion, and its counterpart in the New Mexico Constitution, art. 2, § 15, is referred to as the double jeopardy clause.
The double jeopardy provision prohibits a person from being tried twice for the same offense. In definining "same offense," New Mexico'courts have held that if the same evidence
which would support a conviction of one offense would necessarily convict that person of
another offense, the two offenses are, for the purposes of the double jeopardy clause, the same
offense. Consequently, prosecution of a defendant can be had under only one of the statutes.
See notes 212-213, supra.
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ciency. The policies in Smith argued against merger. The court noted
that if a dealer in illegal drugs knew that he could traffic in different
drugs without multiple prosecutions, he would be free to keep a selection of drugs on hand. This might lead to larger sales, easier access to more drugs, and a greater possibility of mixing incompatible
drugs. The court held, therefore, that policy and public interest militated against the merger of the four counts into one.
The second important controlled substances case, State v. Carr,
occasioned a careful examination of the CSA. The defendant was a
physician who wrote prescriptions for Niki Jones. Jones obtained
the drugs, sold them, and returned part of the proceeds to Carr. Carr
was convicted of 42 violations of the CSA. The jury found him
guilty of trafficking, distributing, and intentionally acquiring and
possessing certain controlled substances. The court of appeals, in a
lengthy opinion, upheld the convictions.
The defendant made several arguments on appeal. He argued that
a physician writing a prescription is dispensing, rather than
distributing, drugs, and is therefore immune from prosecution. He
supported this argument by contending that the legislature had set
up a "different parallel system" of regulation for those
permitted by
21 5
law to conduct transactions in controlled substances.
The court rejected this argument on three grounds. First, the court
said that the overall scheme of the CSA indicates that persons such
as the defendant should come within its ambit. The law does not
make an exception for persons registered to conduct transactions in
controlled substances. The law says, instead, that its sanctions will
apply to any person 16 found guilty of trafficking. Further, the court
noted that the federal law, after which the CSA is modeled, has been
construed to include registered persons.217
The second reason that the court rejected the defendant's argument was that the so-called "parallel system of regulation" concerned technical violations, with less severe penalties than the more
general provisions of the CSA. 2 " The court thought it unlikely that
the legislature could have intended for a registrant to get off more
lightly than a non-registered person who committed a similar offense.
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's argument because it
would lead to an absurdity. Under the "parallel system" that the
215. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-12 to -19 (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
216. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-20(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1980) (emphasis supplied by the court).
217. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
218. Compare, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-14 (1978) which provides that a registrant's
license shall be revoked if he or she distributes controlled substances, with N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 30-31-20 (1978), which provides that the distribution of controlled substances is a felony.
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defendant urged, a physician could avoid prosecution for trafficking
entirely by writing a prescription. According to the court, the seriousness of the crme made it unlikely that the legislature intended for
sanctions to be so easily avoidable.
The defendant next argued that a physician's handing out of drugs
could not be what the legislature meant by "trafficking," because
physicians must have some leeway in handing out sample medications for legitimate medical purposes. The court acceded to this
argument, but found that the CSA can allow dispensing by a physician only for legitimate medical purposes.2 ,9 The court indicated that
the legitimacy of the purpose is determined by the physician's intent.
Activity which exceeded these legitimate purposes would be distributing rather than dispensing, and therefore subject to prosecution.
The Carr decision substantially clarifies New Mexico law with
regard to the criminal liability of a physician dispensing drugs. The
court held that physicians do not stand in any privileged position,
but can be held criminally liable for trafficking in controlled substances to the same extent as can lay persons.
F. Perjury
The perjury trial of Emilio Naranjo was examined by both the
court of appeals and the supreme court during the Survey year. Both
courts reversed his conviction, but they did so on slightly different
grounds.
Naranjo was the county sheriff for Rio Arriba County. He testified at the trial of Moses Morales concerning Morales' alleged possession of marijuana. Morales was acquitted. Naranjo was indicted
for perjury2 20 and convicted. He appealed and the court of appeals
" ' In State v. Naranjo, the supreme court granted cerreversed. 22
tiorari, then affirmed in part and reversed in part.22 2
Two criminal law questions were raised by the case. First, the
courts discussed the sufficiency and specificity of the indictment.
Both courts found the indictment to be insufficient. Second, the requirements of proof in a perjury case were examined in the context
of a claim that there was no substantial evidence to support the con219. The court quoted the strong language of the seventh circuit: "When . . . a physician
acts without any legitimate medical purpose and beyond the course of professional practice by
selling prescriptions that allow the bearer to obtain controlled substances, his conduct should
be treated like that of any street-corner pill-pusher." United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062,
1067 (7th Cir. 1975); See United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977).
220. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-25-1 (1978).
221. State v. Naranjo, 94 N.M. 413, 611 P.2d 1107 (1979).
222. 94 N.M.407, 611 P.2d 1101 (1980).
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viction. Both courts acceded to the claim of insufficient evidence,
but with different emphasis.
The defendant first argued that the indictment was insufficient to
charge the defendant with perjury. The court of appeals agreed that
the indictment should have been dismissed. The court found that the
statement alleged to be false was in fact true.223
Judge Walters, in a special concurrence, pointed out that the first
of these questions was improperly decided. It is not the province of
the court of appeals to determine questions of fact. Judge Walters
would have also concluded that the indictment should have been dismissed. She argued that the allegations of falsity were not sufficiently specific to give Naranjo notice of what he was required to defend against." 4 The supreme court agreed with Judge Walters on this
issue.2 25
The second criminal law question raised by the Naranjo case was
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The
court of appeals agreed with the defendant that the evidence was insufficient, focusing its attention on two separate issues. First, the
state's entire case hung on the uncorroborated testimony of one
witness. The rule in New Mexico is that the testimony of an uncorroborated witness is not sufficient evidence to support a conviction
of perjury.21 6 Second, the essential elements of the crime were simply
not addressed by the proof adduced at trial. For example, the state
presented no evidence that the defendant had knowledge that his
statement was false. Without evidence of this, the crime of perjury
was not proved.2 2 The court of appeals emphasized that the requirements of proof in a perjury case are extremely strict, and every presumption will be in the defendant's favor.228 The court decided that
the state failed to overcome the presumption that the defendant was
telling the truth.
223. As the supreme court pointed out, the poorly drawn indictment made it impossible to
determine which statements were relevant to the perjury charge.
224. See N.M. Rules Crim. P. 5(d). Seealso Territory v. Lockhard, 9 N.M. 523, 45 P. 1106
(1896).
225. Naranjo v. State, 94 N.M. at 411, 611 P.2d at 1105.
226. In Territory v. Williams, 9 N.M. 400, 54 P.2d 232 (1898), the court said:
This evidence alone, and uncorroborated, is not such proof as the law requires in
trials for perjury; it is one oath against another; and if the citizens of this territory can be convicted of perjury and sent to the penitentiary for a term of years,
and their characters ruined for life by oath against oath, as in this case, then the
best citizens may well shun the courts as a traveler would quicksand.
9 N.M. at 402, 54 P. at 232. See also State v. Borunda, 83 N.M. 563, 494 P.2d 976 (Ct. App.
1972).
227. State v. Olson, 92 Wash.2d 134, 594 P.2d 1337 (1979); State v. Wash.2d 134, 594 P.2d
1337 (1979); State v. Wallis, 50 Wash.2d 350, 311 P.2d 659 (1957).
228. Richardson v. State, 45 Ohio App. 46, 186 N.E. 510 (1933).
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The supreme court agreed that there was not sufficient evidence to
sustain a guilty verdict. The supreme court opinion, however, did
not dwell upon the special requirements of proof in a perjury case.
The court merely pointed out that no testimony indicated that the
defendant's statement was false. It was possible to infer the falsity of
the statement, but the court decided that the state had certainly not
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

